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I. INTRODUCTION
The credit rating agencies are supposed to be gatekeepers to the public 
securities markets.1 As “gatekeepers,” they are reputational intermediaries in the 
investment process.2 Other gatekeepers include: independent auditors, credit 
rating agencies, securities analysts, investment bankers, and attorneys.3 The 
function of these reputational intermediaries is to act as neutral third party advisors 
to the investment process.4  While these intermediaries are paid for their opinions 
by one or more parties to a transaction, in theory the opinions will be neutral.  This 
is due to the thought that any resulting reputational damage from non-neutral 
opinions would severely damage long-term profitability, in exchange for mere 
short-term profits.5
The rating agencies are very different from other gatekeepers, as they exist in 
a position of profitable limbo somewhere between market journalist and state 
authority.6 They claim they are merely reputational intermediaries sought by 
numerous market participants for neutral opinions on the safety of securities 
products.7 At the same time, they uniquely occupy a niche where government 
regulation mandates that market participants utilize their ratings; they are, in fact, 
selling compliance with official regulation.8 This puts them in a position of 
incredible power9 and provides them with little accountability.10 With the recent 
explosion of unregulated securities11
1 John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW.
1403, 1405 (2002).  
and the ensuing near collapse of the financial 
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See id. at 1406. 
6 Christopher M. Bruner, States, Markets, and Gatekeepers: Public-Private Regulatory Regimes in 
an Era of Economic Globalization, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 125, 168 (2008).  
7
See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1405.
8 Bruner, supra note 6, at 168 (“[U]nlike auditors, analysts, investment bankers, corporate 
attorneys, stock exchanges, and others—[the agencies] literally regulate admission to bond markets, and 
possess the power to articulate public policy in so doing, with no straightforward form of accountability 
to constrain them.”).  
9 As New York Times Columnist Thomas Friedman put it: “[t]here are two superpowers in the 
world today in my opinion.  There’s the United States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service.  The 
United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your 
bonds.  And believe me, it’s not clear sometimes who’s more powerful.”  Interview by David Gergen 
with Thomas Friedman, Columnist, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 1996), available at http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/gergen/friedman.html.
10 Bruner, supra note 6.  Conversely, auditors, for example, have historically had substantial 
accountability through the courts.  Id.
11 Namely, derivatives were made statutorily and were largely unregulated by the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000.  Gwen Moran, Do Derivatives Need More Oversight?, ON WALL 
ST., Jan. 1, 2009, http://www.onwallstreet.com/ows_issues/2009_1/do-derivatives-need-more-
oversight2637051-1.html.  Incidentally, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 was a 
largely bi-partisan act which was introduced by both Republicans and Democrats and was passed by the 
then Republican controlled House and Senate and was signed into law by President Clinton on 
December 21, 2000.  Karen Buck Burgess et al., The SEC Speaks in 2001: Recent Legislative 
Developments Affecting the Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission - DECEMBER 29, 2000,
1234 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 797, 801, 844, 846 (2001).
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markets,12 it seems these agencies are perhaps not gatekeepers, but rather 
mechanics, greasing the wheels of a giant runaway train of dangerous financial 
products.13
This article will explore the rating agencies’ role in this recent crisis and will 
discuss the need for increased regulation or liability14 for the agencies to function 
effectively.  This comment will ask what is the most realistic way to accomplish 
this.  Part II is an introduction to who the rating agencies are and what they do.15
Part III looks at how we got where we are and explores two common criticisms 
against the agencies that even their former employees attest to.16 Part IV navigates 
recent responses, both by the agencies to criticism and by the government through 
the SEC.17 Part V looks at past liability exposure to the agencies and common 
defenses they have raised.18 There will also be some discussion of whether 
legislation passed has changed anything, as well as a look at a common barrier to 
litigation against the agencies.19 Finally, Part VI offers the author’s own opinions 
on where we go from here.20
II. INTRODUCING THE PLAYERS
A.  Who The Rating Agencies Are
While there are possibly 150 credit rating agencies worldwide,21 only ten 
agencies are currently registered with the SEC as a Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organization (“NRSRO”).22 Of the ten registered NRSROs, 
only three really matter.23 These three “major” credit rating agencies include 
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”),24 Standard & Poor’s (“S.&P.”),25
12
Soros Sees No Bottom for World Financial “Collapse,” REUTERS UK, Feb. 21, 2009, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUKTRE51K0AV20090221.
13
End of Wall Street: What Happened (The Wall Street Journal Video Jan. 5, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/video-center/the-end-of-wall-street.html. As Frank Raiter, former Managing 
Director and Head of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Ratings at Standard & Poor’s so aptly put 
it, the rating agencies were greasing the wheels of this train which was powered by low interest rates, 
driven by the investment banks, conducted by lenders and investment bankers, and ridden “standing 
room only” by investors.  Id.
14 Alternatively, there could be increased regulation and liability.
15
See infra Part II.
16
See infra Part III.
17
See infra Part IV.
18
See infra Part V.
19
See infra Part V.
20
See infra Part VI.
21 Alec Klein, Smoothing the Way for Debt Markets: Firms’ Influence Has Grown Along with 
World’s Reliance on Bonds, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2004, at A18.
22 Elliott R. Curzon et al., SEC Proposes Rules for Registration of Credit Rating Agencies, 124
BANKING L.J. 438, 441-42 (2007). 
23 Klein, supra note 21.
24 Moody’s is owned by Moody’s Corporation, which is a publicly traded corporation.  NYSE 
Listing Directory: Moody’s Corporation, http://www.nyse.com/ about/listed/mco.html (last visited Feb. 
21, 2009).  
25 Standard and Poor’s is a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., which is a publicly 
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and Fitch Ratings (“Fitch”).26 Moody’s and S.&P. are the largest, with each 
respectively owning about forty percent of the credit rating markets.27 Fitch is the 
smallest of the three and is often considered a “tie-breaker” by investors when the 
other two agencies have assigned similar, but not equal, ratings.28
B. What the Agencies Do
An NRSRO can register in one or more categories with the SEC.  These 
categories include financial institutions; insurance companies; corporate issuers; 
issuers of government, municipal, and foreign government securities; and asset-
backed securities.29 Within these categories, the NRSROs provide self-described 
“opinions” in the form of ratings on creditworthiness.30 The agencies create these 
opinions by gathering and analyzing public and private information and reporting 
the results in a letter, which generally distinguishes at a basic level between 
investment grade and non-investment grade.31 These opinions are highly valued 
by investors when making investment decisions.32 The ratings are valued because 
they supposedly convey an evaluation of risk of non-payment and default 
likelihood;33 which directly affects how much an investor is willing to pay 
according to his or her risk appetite.34
traded corporation.  Standard & Poor’s, www.standardandpoors.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
A prime example of the importance 
investors put on these ratings occurred on January 19, 1990, when Moody’s
lowered its debt rating on RJR-Nabisco, citing worries about the company’s cash 
26 Fitch is a private company.  It is owned by Fitch Inc., which is often referred to as the Fitch 
Group.  Fitch Ratings Visual Timeline, http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/marcom/group_ 
timeline.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).  Fitch Inc. is a majority-owned subsidiary of Fimalac, S.A., an 
international business support services group headquartered in Paris, France.  About Fitch, 
http://www.fitchratings.com/jsp/ creditdesk/AboutFitch.faces?context=1&detail=1 (last visited Feb. 21, 
2009).  
27 Klein, supra note 21.
28 Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 Wash. U.L.Q. 43, 60 (2004); Jeff Jewell &
Miles Livingston, A Comparison of Bond Ratings from Moody’s S&P and Fitch IBCA, 8 FIN. MKTS.,
INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 4, Jan. 2002, at 1, available at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-
bin/fulltext/119084174/PDFSTART.
29 Elliott R. Curzon et al., supra note 22.
30
See Hill, supra note 28, at 48.
31 SEC, Credit Rating Agencies—NRSROs, http://www.sec.gov/answers/nrsro.htm (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2009).  Ratings are further broken down into tiers and sub-tiers assigned as the agencies 
determine rating worthiness.  BondsOnline: Long Term Bond Ratings, http://www.bondsonline.com/ 
asp/research/bondratings.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).  All use letter-based grading systems.  Id.
S.&P.’s ratings, for example, range from AAA for the most financially stable companies to D for a 
company in default.  Amy Borrus et al., The Credit-Raters: How They Work and How They Might Work 
Better, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Apr. 8, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_14/ 
b3777054.htm.  
32 Borrus et al., supra note 31.
33 Gregory Husisian, What Standard of Care Should Govern the World’s Shortest Editorials?: An 
Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability?, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 413 (1990).  However, some 
commentators argue that the rating agencies assign actually affect the cost of the capital themselves, 
instead of merely revealing underlying risk.  Id. at 411 n.1.  Either way, investors take these ratings 
seriously.  When applied to a company, investors regard these ratings as a key measurement of the 
company’s financial health.  See Borrus et al., supra note 31. Some loans must be restructured or 
repaid if an issuer’s credit rating falls below investment grade.  Id.
34
See Borrus et al., supra note 31.
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flow while S.&P. affirmed an existing higher rating.35 RJR-Nabisco’s bonds lost 
twenty percent of their value within two days, cumulatively equaling several 
hundred million dollars.36
These opinions are not merely recognized by investors for private market 
purposes.  A large amount of government regulation mandates ratings assigned by 
these agencies to be considered to meet official regulatory requirements.37  These 
requirements are extensive and include rating thresholds for banks, trust 
companies, pension funds, insurance companies, and money market funds.38 This 
has led to a bit of a paradox: investors required by regulation to consider mere 
“opinions.”39
III. MOUNTING CRITICISM OF THE AGENCIES’ ACTIONS
A.  How We Got Here
Among the many financial instruments rating agencies cover is securitized 
loan pools.40 One early failure attributed to the rating agencies was their assigning 
faulty risk assessments to securitized loan pools composed of mortgages, known as 
“mortgage-backed securities” (“MBS”).41 Additionally, in the ensuing economic 
downturn, the agencies failed to promptly downgrade troubled securities’ ratings42
and companies’ ratings,43
Failure by the credit rating agencies to assign accurate MBS and 
collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) ratings was a key contributor to the current 
even when it was clear the securities and companies 
were troubled.  
35 Husisian, supra note 33, at 411.  
36
Id.
37 Hill, supra note 28, at 53. 
38
Id. Typically, regulation requires an investment grade “threshold” to be met through 
encouragement of a requirement of investment grade debt to be held instead of debt that is less highly 
rated or unrated.  These preferences matter; for instance, the designation of “money market” fund for all 
regulatory purposes generally requires a limit on short-term securities held to only the highest two 
ratings categories by NRSROs.  See Bruner, supra note 6, at 140.  California’s Insurance Code limits 
“excess funds investments” to only investment in the highest three ratings categories by an NRSRO.  Id.
Additionally, large public pensions, such as CalPers, require ratings thresholds to be met.  To 
understand the extent the use of these “opinions” has reached, consider that the “Basel II” international 
banking requirements have credit rating consideration requirements incorporated into their regulations.  
Id. at 141.
39
See infra Part IV.A (discussing the agencies’ continuing contention that they are offering mere 
opinions).  According to their contention, one would think that nobody is actually required to look at 
ratings.
40 Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of 
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2046 (2007).
41 Gretchen Morgenson, Credit Rating Agency Heads Grilled by Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2008, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/business/economy/23rating.html.
42
Credit Crisis Hurts Rating Agencies, FORBES, Aug. 14, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/ 
08/13/credit-rating-crisis-oxford_0814oxfordanalytica.html (“Despite widespread awareness of 
problems in the subprime sector, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s did not downgrade mortgage bonds 
and related structured debt products until July 10, 2007.”).
43 Charlie Gasparino, Rating Agencies Hold Off Downgrading MBIA, Ambac, CNBC, Jan. 31, 
2008, http://www.cnbc.com/id/22932650.
138 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:I
economic crisis.44 From the late 1990s through 2007, investment banks and other 
issuers packaged residential loans directly and indirectly into MBSs,45 and 
CDOs.46 In an effort to maximize profitability, these issuers created these 
securities by dividing underlying risk of default into tranches, or levels of security, 
each of which would be assigned a separate rating grade.47 Often, the grade would 
be based on a sliding scale of coupon rates, which in turn were based on the level 
of credit protection afforded to the security.48 Credit protection was designed to 
shield the tranches from loss of interest and principal arising from defaults on the 
loans backing these securities.  The degree of credit protection assigned to a 
tranche was known as its “credit enhancement.”49 Three forms of credit 
enhancement include subordination,50 over-collateralization, 51 excess spread,52
44
See Marie Leone, Subprime Slam: SEC Exposes Rating Agency Faults, CFO, July 8, 2008, 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/11699984?f=related; Drew Voros, Uncovering the Subprime Debacle,
CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, http http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/is_20081230/ 
ai_n31157668/.
45 According to the SEC, mortgage-backed securities are defined as follows:
[D]ebt obligations that represent claims to the cash flows from pools of mortgage 
loans, most commonly on residential property.  Mortgage loans are purchased 
from banks, mortgage companies, and other originators and then assembled into 
pools by a governmental, quasi-governmental, or private entity.  The entity then 
issues securities that represent claims on the principal and interest payments 
made by borrowers on the loans in the pool, a process known as securitization.
SEC, Mortgage-Backed Securities, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgage securities.htm (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2009).  MBSs come in many different structures.  According to the SEC, the most basic types 
are “pass-through participation certificates, which entitle the holder to a pro-rata share of all principal 
and interest payments made on the pool of loan assets.”  Id. More complicated MBSs are known as 
collateralized mortgage obligations or mortgage derivatives.  These more complicated versions may be 
designed to protect investors from or expose investors to various types of risk.  An important risk with 
regard to residential mortgages involves prepayments, typically because homeowners refinance when 
interest rates fall.  Absent protection, such prepayments would return principal to investors precisely 
when their options for reinvesting those funds may be relatively unattractive.  Id.  
46 Creation of a CDO is similar to that of a MBS.  OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS &
EXAMINATIONS, SEC, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S 
EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 9 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf.  A sponsor creates a trust to hold the CDO’s assets and 
issue securities.  Id.  Usually a CDO is comprised of 200 or so debt securities in a pool.  Id.  This pool 
may include MBSs along with many other types of debt securities.  Id.  Similar to a MBS, the trust then 
collects interest and principal payments from the underlying debt securities pool and makes interest and 
principal payments to investors in the CDO securities issued.  Id. One significant difference between a 
CDO and a MBS is that the trust may actively manage the CDO’s underlying assets, whereas the 
mortgage loan pool underlying a MBS generally remains static.  Id.
47 Richard Tomlinson & David Evans, CDO Boom Masks Subprime Losses, Abetted by S&P, 
Moody’s, Fitch, BLOOMBERG, May 31, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive 
&sid=ajs7BqG4_X8I. 
48 Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-57967, 93 SEC Docket 1266 (June 16, 2008), available at  http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/2008/34-57967.pdf. 
49
Id.
50 Subordination, which is the most common, is the creation of a hierarchy of loss absorption 
among a pool of tranche securities.  Id. For example, if securities are issued in ten different tranches, 
the first (or senior) tranche has nine subordinate tranches; the next highest tranche has eight subordinate 
tranches and so on.  See id. Any loss of interest and principal experienced by the pool of tranche 
securities due to delinquencies and defaults in its underlying loans are allocated first to the lowest 
tranche until it loses all of its principal amount (or a pre-arranged percentage thereof) and then to the 
next lowest tranche and so on up the tranche levels.  Id.  Therefore, the senior tranche would be 
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and bond insurance for CDOs.53  The process of creating these “credit enhanced”
securities had almost no official oversight54 and grew exponentially in 
popularity.55
MBS and CDO issuers further profited and complicated the process by 
substituting credit default swaps (“CDS”) into CDOs instead of actual MBSs or 
MBSs holding CDOs.56 Many CDOs were owned by banks or insurance 
companies.  The regulators for those banks and insurance companies were 
overwhelmed and relied on the NRSOs to police CDOs.57 Kevin Fry, chairman of 
the Invested Asset Working Group of the U.S. National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners stated: “[a]s regulators, we just have to trust that rating agencies 
are going to monitor CDOs and find the subprime . . . . We can’t get there.  We 
don’t have the resources to get our arms around it.”58
With little regulation, the rating companies profited by advising issuers on 
how to squeeze the most profit out of these securities by maximizing the ratings on 
tranches.59 Additionally, after these securities had been created, investment banks 
relied on the credit agencies to rate these securities favorably so various investment 
groups, such as hedge funds, pension funds, and even other investment banks, 
would invest in these “safe” securities.60 These institutions often relied on ratings 
so heavily that due diligence was overlooked or thought unnecessary.61 This large 
scheme of close relationships began to fall apart when mortgage delinquencies and 
defaults skyrocketed62 and the value of these securities plummeted.63
considered very “safe” as it would not incur any losses until all the lower tranches have first absorbed 
losses from the underlying loans.  Id.
It became 
51 Over-collateralization refers to an amount of principal balance in a mortgage pool, which 
exceeds the principal balance of the tranche securities issued by the trust.  Id. This excess principal 
creates an additional “equity” tranche, or “cushion” of equity, below the lowest tranche security to 
absorb losses.  Id.
52 Excess spread refers to the amount by which the total interest received on underlying loans 
exceeds the total interest payments due to investors in the tranche securities (plus administrative 
expenses, which include loan servicing fees, premiums due on derivatives contracts, and bond 
insurance).  Id.  “This excess spread can be used to build up loss reserves or pay off delinquent interest 
payments due to a tranche security.”  Id.
53 In addition to subordination, over-collateralization, and excess spread, CDOs often use bond 
insurance as a method of credit enhancement.  See id.
54 Tomlinson & Evans, supra note 47.
55 Morgenson, supra note 41.  One NRSRO claimed the average percentage of subprime MBSs in 
the collateral pools of CDOs it rated grew from 43.3% in 2003 to 71.3% in 2006.  OFFICE OF 
COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 11.
56 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 11.  This way, the 
issuer did not have to actually purchase subprime MBSs or other CDOs and instead would enter into 
credit default swaps referencing subprime MBSs or CDOs or indexes on MBSs.  See id. at 12.  Some of 
these CDOs were composed entirely of credit default swaps (“synthetic CDOs”); others were composed 
of a combination of credit default swaps and actual MBSs (“hybrid CDOs”).  See id.
57 Tomlinson & Evans, supra note 47.
58
See id.
59
Id.  This created a conflict of interest.  See infra Part III.B.2.  
60
See Voros, supra note 44.  This also created a conflict of interest.  See infra Part III.B.1
61
See Testimony of John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Before the Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, (2008), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ 
ftp/release/2008-63b.pdf.
62
See Tomlinson & Evans, supra note 47.
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clear to everyone that these “safe” securities had been severely overrated by the 
rating agencies.64  Moody’s, S.&P., and Fitch then proceeded to quickly 
downgrade ratings on thousands of securities, wiping out billions of dollars of 
investors value.65
B. Conflicts of Interest
1. Conflict of Interest: Issuer Pays Model
Ratings were originally conducted on a subscription based method.66
However, in the 1970s, the rise of the copy machine led to the issuer pays model.67
Former officials of Moody’s and S.&P. testified before Congress that the credit 
rating agencies’ disastrous performance in the last decade can be attributed to 
conflicts of interest, which primarily includes their current issuer pays business 
model.68 They allege this model, where securities issuers pay credit rating 
agencies to rate the issuers’ products,69 is inherently flawed.  Frank L. Raiter, who 
was previously the head of mortgage ratings at S.&P. for ten years, summarized 
the company’s failures by simply saying: “[p]rofits were running the show.”70
Jerome S. Fons, who was the managing director for credit policy at Moody’s until 
2007, testified that under the issuer pays model, the rating agencies’ interests can 
eclipse those of investors.71
Not only is there the general problem with this model in that issuers have 
great amounts of leverage over the rating agencies, but a further weakness is that it 
undercuts incentives to monitor and downgrade securities in the post-issuance 
63 Stephen Gandel, For Geithner’s “Bad Bank”: A Toxic Financial Mutant, TIME.COM, Feb. 9, 
2009, http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1878295,00.html.  Not only did the value of 
these and other similar securities drop, but they became almost worthless as parties tried unsuccessfully 
to determine a value for them.  See id.
64 Morgenson, supra note 41.  Over the course of 2007 alone, Moody’s issued 1,655 discrete 
downgrade actions (including multiple rating actions on the same tranche) on CDOs. Proposed Rules 
for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 48, at 24.  This constituted 
roughly ten times the number of downgrade actions in 2006 and twice as many as in 2002 (previously 
the most volatile year for CDOs).  Id.  The magnitude of these CDO downgrades (number of notches) 
was noticeably sizeable at roughly seven notches.  Id. Prior to 2007, average downgrades moved three 
to four notches.  Id. In the words of a March 2008 report by Moody’s, “The scope and degree of CDO 
downgrades in 2007 was unprecedented.”  Id. As of April 1, 2008, S.&P. had downgraded 3,068 
tranches from 705 CDO transactions.  Id. This totaled $321.9 billion in issuance.  Id. S.&P. had also 
placed 443 ratings from 119 transactions on CreditWatch negative.  Id. By mid-December 2007, Fitch 
had issued downgrades to 158 of the 431 CDOs it had rated with exposure to RMBS.  Id. Among the 
thirty CDOs with exposure to the subprime RMBS which “suffered the greatest extent and magnitude of 
negative rating migration,” all but $82.7 million of the $20.7 billion in balance was downgraded.  Id.
65 Morgenson, supra note 41.
66 Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product 
Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1679 n.416 (2008).
67
Id.
68 Morgenson, supra note 41.
69 Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 48, at 26.
70 Morgenson, supra note 41.
71
Id.
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market.72 This is because the continuing “surveillance” of the security is paid for 
in advance from each issuer. 73 Few issuers are eager for their securities to be 
monitored closely, especially if it could result in downgrades.74 So ratings are 
seldom downgraded until long after public information has signaled an obvious 
deterioration in an issuer’s probability of default.75
2. Conflict of Interest: Active Role in Creation of Securities
The process of rating securitized products is very different from the process 
of rating traditional debt.76 In the case of traditional debt, an issuer is unable to 
adjust creditworthiness before issuance.77  Therefore, pre-rating dialogue between 
the rating agency and the issuer is of limited significance.78  However, in the case 
of securitized products, extensive pre-rating dialogue takes place.79 This process 
begins with an issuer telling the rating agency a desired rating, and the rating 
agency indicating whether the structure and level of credit support proposed by the 
issuer will suffice to achieve that rating.80 The increased complexity and 
introduction of MBSs and CDOs led to the precarious position of the agencies not 
merely creating neutral ratings on other parties’ instruments, but instead becoming 
creators of the instruments themselves.  This created a unique conflict of interest, 
as the agencies had previously merely assigned ratings to debt and companies in 
which they had no active role.81 With these new structured finance vehicles “the 
agencies [were] effectively involved in structuring these transactions,” according 
to Karl Bergqwist, a senior manager at Gartmore Investment Management Plc in 
London.82 This is something the agencies vehemently deny.83
IV. RESPONSE TO THE AGENCIES’ ACTIONS 
In response to the rating agencies’ actions, there have been numerous 
proposals for reform of the rating methods by industry groups, policymakers and 
72
Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules Have Any Bite?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Dec. 10, 
2008, available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2112.
73
Id.  “Surveillance” refers to the process of an agency monitoring it own ratings on an ongoing 
basis in order to ensure accuracy, and so it may enact rating changes as necessary.  OFFICE OF 
COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 21.  The agencies charge issuers, 
upfront or annual fees, for surveillance.  Proper surveillance is important, especially where issuers do 
not publicly make available their due diligence information or underlying loan performance 
information.  Id.
74
Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules Have Any Bite?, supra note 72.
75
Id.
76 Kettering, supra note 66, at 1681.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1681-82.  
81 Tomlinson & Evans, supra note 47.
82
Id.  
83
Id.  It seems as though this active role at least raises a strong possibility for closer than arms-
length rating transactions to occur.
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even the agencies themselves.84 Organizations that have issued propositions 
and/or requested comments relating to the role of ratings and agencies include the 
SEC, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the Financial Stability Forum, 
and the agencies themselves.85
A.  The Agencies’ Own Response
The agencies’ response to the idea that they held the role of de facto 
regulator in a securities market that had no official watchdog was that policing 
these securities is not their job.86 The companies point out that they only offer 
their educated opinions.87 Noel Kirnon, senior managing director at Moody’s said 
“[w]hat we’re saying is that many people have the tendency to rely on [our 
ratings], and we want to make sure that they don’t.”88 Moody’s, S.&P., and Fitch 
all presently assert investors should not base any investment decision on their 
analyses, as they are merely opinions. 89
The three current executives of Moody’s, S.&P., and Fitch also deny that 
conflicts of interest impaired their companies’ judgment on mortgage securities.90
They all claim their methods of rating were not flawed.91 However, all of the 
companies are engaged in some form of implementation of initiatives which they 
claim are designed to address conflicts of interest or strengthen rating methods. 92
B. The Government’s Response: SEC Findings 
Since the origination of the “NRSRO” designation in 1975,93 the procedure 
to become an NRSRO was tightly held by the SEC.94
84 Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 48.
Not only did the SEC 
choose who they wanted designated as an NRSRO, there were no statutes or 
regulations establishing substantive or procedural requirements for becoming an 
85
Id.
86 Tomlinson & Evans, supra note 47.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. The idea that investors shouldn’t rely on these ratings seems preposterous.  If ratings are 
only opinions, as the agencies claim, then they should be nearly worthless as they would leave investors 
“with very little new information.”  Id. However, the reality is these ratings are not only highly coveted 
by investors, but are often required to be considered by government mandate.  See supra note 38.  It 
seems ridiculous that the agencies charge hefty fees to digest information and issue ratings that 
investors must look at, all the while saying “we hope these ratings are not relied upon.”  Surprisingly, 
this “opinion” designation has successfully formed the basis as one of the agencies’ claimed legal 
defenses.  See infra note 198; Kettering, supra note 66, at 1689. 
90 Morgenson, supra note 41.
91
Id.
92
See id.  Interestingly, S.&P. has taken twenty-seven initiatives to “enhance the integrity of [its] 
ratings process.”  Id.  For example, S.&P. now rotates analysts in their assignments and has established 
an ombudsman office, “to protect against conflicts.”  Id. Moody’s has also changed its practices “to 
strengthen its standards.”  Id.  These actions seem to strongly infer an admission of wrongdoing.
93 Hill, supra note 28, at 54.
94
Id.
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NRSRO.95 A principal of the Egan-Jones rating agency once said an SEC official 
told him, “We won’t tell you the criteria [for obtaining NRSRO designation], 
otherwise you might qualify.”96
On September 29, 2006,97 the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (the “Act”)
was signed into law.98  The Act sought to modify the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and create greater oversight of the rating agencies by creating a new section, 
section 15E.99  Section 15E provided much needed SEC registration requirements 
for NRSROs; 100 it also provided authority for the SEC to implement financial 
reporting and oversight rules with respect to registered NRSROs.101 Additionally, 
the Act amended section 17(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act to provide that 
the SEC require reporting and recordkeeping requirements for registered 
NRSROs.102 The Act also established procedures to manage the handling of 
material non-public information.103 It also required disclosure and management of 
conflicts of interest, and it prohibited a NRSRO from having certain conflicts of 
interest and engaging in certain unfair, abusive, or coercive practices.104
The agencies objected to the Act, arguing that the legislation represented an 
unconstitutional infringement of the company’s free speech.105
Ultimately though, while the Act did require disclosure to the SEC of a 
general description of each agency’s procedures and methodologies for 
determining credit ratings, and granted the SEC broad authority to examine all 
books and records of the agencies, it did not allow the SEC to regulate “the 
substance of the credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies” by which any 
NRSRO determines credit ratings.106
95
Id.
In fact, the Act expressly prohibited this.  
This effectively left the act toothless, other than giving the SEC the ability to 
expose the agencies’ practices to the light of day.
96
Id. at 54-55.  Although the NRSO designation may not seem like much, because of government 
regulation, this designation was and still is very valuable.  
97 While the Act was introduced on September 29, 2006, the SEC’s related rules were not adopted 
until June 18, 2007, and they became effective on June 26, 2007.  OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS 
& EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 4. 
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.  Until this, “NRSRO” had remained undefined.  There was no formal procedure for 
qualifying as a NRSRO, and the SEC had tightly controlled who was given the designation.  See Hill, 
supra note 28, at 54 and accompanying text.  
101 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 4.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. 
105 Marie Leone, Bush Signs Rating Agency Reform Act, CFO, Oct. 2, 2006, http://www.cfo.com/
article.cfm/7991492/c_7989907?f=TodayInFinance_Inside.  This seems like a poor argument in light of 
the use of ratings being mandated by government to be considered.  This goes back to the agencies’ 
constant assertion that ratings are merely “opinions.” While this argument has held up historically, it 
would seem time to move forward and admit these ratings are significant tools used in financial 
analysis, and are sold as such.  Additionally, it would seem the government should have some authority 
to set standards for quality of the ratings since the government is going to mandate reliance on the 
quality of the ratings.
106 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 4.
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While the changes under the Act were welcome, more was needed.  On June 
16, 2008, in response to the recent economic catastrophe that the rating agencies 
had contributed to, the SEC published a new “Proposed Rules for Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations” (“Proposed Rules “).107
On December 1, 2008, The Financial Economists Roundtable, a group 
107
Id. These Proposed Rules sought to:
Enhance the disclosure and comparability of credit ratings performance statistics; 
Increase the disclosure of information about structured finance products; 
Require more information about the procedures and methodologies used to 
determine credit ratings for structured finance products; 
Strengthen internal control processes through reporting requirements; and 
Address conflicts of interest arising from the process of rating structured finance 
products; and 
Reduce undue reliance in the Commission’s rules on NRSRO ratings, thereby 
promoting increased investor due diligence.
Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 48, at 7.  These 
Proposed Rules included prohibiting an NRSRO from issuing a rating on a structured product unless 
information on the characteristics of assets underlying the product is available.  OFFICE OF 
COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 4.  This allows other credit rating 
agencies to use the information to rate the same product and, potentially, expose ratings unduly 
influenced by the product’s sponsors.  Id. Additionally, the Proposed Rules sought to:
Prohibit an NRSRO from issuing a rating where the NRSRO or a person 
associated with the NRSRO has made recommendations as to structuring the 
same products that it rates.
Require NRSROs to make all of their ratings and subs- equent rating actions 
publicly available, to facilitate comparisons of NRSROs by making it easier to 
analyze the performance of the credit ratings the NRSROs issue in terms of 
assessing creditworthiness.
Prohibit anyone who participates in determining a credit rating from negotiating 
the fee that the issuer pays for it, to prevent business considerations from 
undermining the NRSRO’s objectivity.
Prohibit gifts from those who receive ratings to those who rate them, in any 
amount over $25.
Require NRSROs to publish performance statistics for one, three and ten years 
within each rating category, in a way that facilitates comparison with their 
competitors in the industry.
Require disclosure by the NRSROs of whether and how information about 
verification performed on the assets underlying a structured product is relied on 
in determining credit ratings.
Require disclosure of how frequently credit ratings are reviewed; whether 
different models are used for ratings surveillance than for initial ratings; and 
whether changes made to models are applied retroactively to existing ratings.
Require NRSROs to make an annual report of the number of ratings actions they 
took in each ratings class.
Require documentation of the rationale for any material difference between the 
rating implied by a qualitative model that is a “substantial component” in the 
process of determining a credit rating and the final rating issued.
Require NRSROs to differentiate the ratings they issue on structured products 
from other securities, either through issuing a report disclosing how procedures 
and methodologies and credit risk characteristics for structured finance products 
differ from other securities, or using different symbols, such as attaching an 
identifier to the rating.
Id. at 4-5. 
2009 RATING AGENCIES 145
composed of senior financial economists,108 issued a statement of strong support 
for the SEC’s Proposed Rules.109 Some of the SEC’s Proposed Rules were 
adopted by the SEC on December 3, 2008.110 However, the SEC’s adopted 
version of these rules turned out to be largely toothless compared to the June 
Proposed Rules.111
In addition to the SEC’s June 2008 Proposed Rules, in July 2008, the SEC 
issued its Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s
Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies.112 This report was the 
culmination of an almost yearlong thorough examination conducted by the SEC.113
Although the firms under examination became subject to regulation as 
NRSROs when they registered with the Commission as NRSROs in September 
2007, and were therefore not subject to legal obligations applicable to NRSROs 
during most of the review period, “the [SEC] nonetheless sought to make relevant 
108 The Financial Economists Roundtable is a “15-year-old group of top economists from around 
the world that meets every year to tackle economic issues.”  Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules 
Have Any Bite?, supra note 72.
109 Financial Economists Roundtable, Statement on Reforming the Role of the Statistical Ratings 
Organizations in the Securitization Process (Dec. 1, 2008), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy 
%20page/FER12%201%2008rev.pdf.  
110
SEC adopts new rules for credit-rating agencies, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 3, 2008, available 
at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/12/03/business/NA-US-SEC-Rating-Agencies.php.  While these 
rules were adopted December 3, 2008, they were published February 2, 2009, and they were made 
effective April 10, 2009.  Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59342 (Feb. 2, 2009) http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ 
2009/34-59342.pdf.
111
Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules Have Any Bite?, supra note 72.  These new rules do 
ban agencies from rating securities they helped create, bar raters from accepting gifts worth more than 
$25 from clients, mandate disclosure of statistics on upgrades and downgrades, and require description 
of information verification steps taken.  However, these rules do not adopt the proposed extra 
requirements on ratings for complex securities.  Id.  Additionally, the rules that proposed reduced use of 
ratings in SEC regulations were not adopted.  Id. This ends up being the SEC adopting the equivalent 
of a “quarter of a loaf” as described by one Wharton finance professor.  Id. Another Wharton finance 
professor noted the original June proposal as being “very bold,” but the new rules are “very limited.”
Id.  This seems to follow a trend of the government doing very little to really interfere in the agencies’ 
actions.  Ironically, one of the major rules adopted by the SEC, the new ban on agencies from rating 
securities they helped create, is commendable in theory, but may be ultimately unenforceable.  Id.  
Because there is so much back and forth in the normal rating process it may be “impossible for the 
courts to distinguish ratings services from advisory services in a definitive way.”  Id. at 3.  Additionally, 
the June proposal for reduced use of ratings in SEC regulations, could have been the most valuable as it 
would have limited the government mandated use of agencies, forced investors to do more research on 
their own, and ultimately decreased the massive amounts of power the agencies hold.  Id. It seems 
unfortunate that the SEC did not adopt this proposal. 
112 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46.
113 This examination began on August 31, 2007, and review period generally covered January 2004 
through July 2008.  Id.  It was conducted by the Staff in the Commission’s Office of Compliance 
Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”), Division of Trading and Markets (“Trading & Markets”) and 
Office of Economic Analysis (“OEA Staff”).  Id. at 3.  It included examinations of Fitch, Moody’s and 
S&P with respect to their activities in rating subprime MBSs and CDOs.  Id. According to the SEC:
The examinations included extensive on-site interviews with the rating agencies’ 
staff, including senior and mid-level managers, initial ratings analysts and 
surveillance analysts, internal compliance personnel and auditors, personnel 
responsible for building, maintaining and upgrading the ratings models and 
methodologies used in the ratings process and other relevant rating agency staff. 
Id.
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factual findings and observations with respect to the activities of these firms in 
rating subprime RMBS and CDOs during the period, as well as to identify possible 
areas for improvement in their practices going forward.”114  This examination led 
the SEC to conclude that there were failures by the agencies in seven key areas: (1) 
the rating agencies dealing with market growth; (2) ratings process disclosure; (3) 
ratings policies and procedure documentation; (4) implementation of new 
practices; (5) documentation; (6) internal surveillance processes; and (7) 
management of Conflicts of Interest.115
1. The Rating Agencies Struggled to Keep up with the Increasing 
Number and complexity of deals
The SEC found that from 2002 to 2006, the volume and complexity of 
RMBS and CDO deals rated by the rating agencies increased exponentially.116
While the agencies increased staffing percentage-wise to match the increase in 
MBS deal volume, their staffing appeared to lag with regard to the increase in 
CDO deal volume.117 Additionally, the agencies appeared to struggle to adapt to 
the increased complexity of the instruments the agencies were asked to rate.118
However, even with this struggle, the agencies pushed for continued ratings in a 
business-as-usual manner.119
The SEC recommended each NRSRO evaluate whether it has sufficient staff 
and resources to manage its volume of business and meet its obligations under 
section 15E of the Exchange Act and the rules applicable to NRSROs.120
114
Id.
115
Id.
116 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 10-13.
117
Id. It could be that the agencies did not want to increase staffing costs.  This however, seems to 
not address the agencies’ desire to handle as much business as possible and be as profitable as possible.
118 This increased complexity arose from expanded use of credit default swaps as well as RMBSs, 
became more complex and less conservative.  Id.  It also may be that due to the increased complexity of 
these products it was difficult to find qualified individuals to fill the positions needed.  The agencies 
probably also just had no idea how large, and how fast the market for these complex securities would 
explode, and couldn’t find people to keep up with the complexity and the workload.  It sounds like there 
was a great deal of burnout.  The SEC report does not address this, but the employees of the agencies 
were not compensated nearly as much as the employees for the issuers and other parties to the 
securitization process.  With their experience, there was probably great incentive to leave the agencies 
for higher paying positions elsewhere.  
119 In one now famous email exchange, an analyst expressed concern that her firm’s model did not 
capture “half” of the deal’s risk, but that “it could be structured by cows and we would rate it.”  Id. at 
12.
120
Id. This evaluation was to be conducted both at the time of the recommendation and on a 
continuing periodic basis.  Id. at 10-13.  While this sounds good, it seems that telling the agencies that 
they need to evaluate their workforce is no real answer.  It would seem logical that they are already 
aware of their staffing levels, particularly given the internal emails addressing this problem which are 
referenced in the SEC report. 
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2.  The Agencies Failed to Disclose Significant Aspects of the Rating 
Process
While the rating agencies stated to the SEC that they had always disclosed 
their MBS and CDO ratings process, certain significant aspects of their ratings 
processes and methodologies were not always disclosed, or were not fully 
disclosed.121
Prior to being registered as NRSROs, the rating agencies did not have a 
regulatory requirement to disclose their methodologies.  In September 2007, three 
major agencies became subject to these rules. They are required to submit detailed 
descriptions of the procedures and methodologies they use.122  The Exchange Act 
and rules applicable to NRSROs specifically delineate the importance of 
disclosure.123
The SEC stated that each NRSRO must conduct a review of its current 
disclosures relating to processes and methodologies for rating RMBS and CDOs to 
assess whether it fully discloses its ratings methodologies in compliance with 
section 15E of the Exchange Act and the rules applicable to NRSROs.124 Further, 
the SEC recommended that each NRSRO be examined to review whether its 
policies governing the timing of disclosure of a significant change to a process or 
methodology are reasonably designed to comply with these requirements.125 Each 
examined NRSRO stated that it will implement the staff’s recommendations.126
The SEC noted that under its Proposed Rules it sought to require enhanced 
disclosure about the procedures and methodologies that NRSROs use to determine 
credit ratings. 127
121
The Proposed Rules also seek to add additional areas that an 
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 13.  This lack of 
disclosure included use of unpublished ratings criteria, failure to disclose materials used in the ratings 
process, disclosure of a criteria report that was obsolete, use of an obsolete model, lag time between 
announcement of implementation of ratings procedure, regularly making of “out of model adjustments” 
without rationale documentation, reducing subprime loss expectations from model projections, and not 
adjusting collateral or cash flow analysis based upon factors no included in the firms models.  Id.
122
Id. at 15.  Since the government mandates reliance on these ratings, it seems the government 
should know how these ratings are being calculated. 
123 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 15.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 15.  Additional proposals included requiring the NRSROs to provide descriptions of:
[P]olicies for determining whether to initiate a credit rating; a description of the 
public and non-public sources of information used in determining credit ratings, 
including information and analysis provided by third-party vendors; the 
quantitative and qualitative models and metrics used to determine credit ratings; 
the methodologies by which credit ratings of other credit rating agencies are 
treated to determine credit ratings for securities or money market instruments 
issued by an asset pool or as part of any asset-backed or mortgaged-backed 
securities transaction; the procedures for interacting with the management of a 
rated obligor or issuer of rated securities or money market instruments; the 
structure and voting process of committees that review or approve credit ratings; 
procedures for informing rated obligors or issuers of rated securities or money 
market instruments about credit rating decisions and for appeals of final or 
pending credit rating decisions; procedures for monitoring, reviewing, and 
updating credit ratings; and procedures to withdraw, or suspend the maintenance 
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applicant and a registered NRSRO would be required to address in its description 
of its procedures and methodologies in its registration form (“Form NRSRO”).128
3.  The Agencies Lacked Written Policies & Procedures for Complex 
Securities
The rating agencies have always had in-house policies which emphasized 
integrity-driven accurate ratings.129 When the agencies registered as NRSROs in 
September 2007, they became required to make and retain specific internal 
documents.130 The SEC noted that while the agencies had improved their policies 
and procedures during the examination period, none of the rating agencies 
examined had specific written procedures for all significant aspects of the process 
of rating RMBSs and CDOs.131 Additionally, the SEC noted that it did not appear 
that the agencies had specific policies and procedures to identify or address errors 
in their models or methodologies.132
The SEC recommended that each NRSRO conduct an internal review and be 
sure that its written MBS and CDO ratings policies and procedures are fully 
documented in accordance with the requirements of Rule 17g-2.133
of a credit rating.
Id. at 15 n.18.  These proposals were adopted by the SEC.  Amendments to Rules for Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 110, at 12.
128 These NRSRO registration form changes include:
How frequently credit ratings are reviewed, whether different models or criteria 
are used for ratings surveillance than for determining initial ratings, whether 
changes made to models and criteria for determining initial ratings are applied 
retroactively to existing ratings and whether changes made to models and criteria 
for performing ratings surveillance are incorporated into the models and criteria 
for determining initial ratings;
Whether and, if so, how information about verification performed on assets 
underlying or referenced by a security or money market instrument issued by an 
asset pool or as part of any asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities 
transaction is relied on in determining credit ratings; and 
Whether and, if so, how assessments of the quality of originators of assets 
underlying or referenced by a security or money market instrument issued by an 
asset pool or as part of any asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities 
transaction play a part in the determination of credit ratings.
Id. at 16.
129
Id. While these policies were in place, it is not clear to what extent they were actually 
observed.  Clearly, at least to some degree, the SEC investigation shows a propensity for the agencies to 
engage in less than transparent procedures.
130 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 16.  Some of these 
requirements include: records pertaining to accounting, employee identities, customers, subscribers, 
products offered, procedures and methodologies, securities rated, internal affairs, credit analysis, 
compliance, internal audits, marketing materials, and communications.  Records to be made and 
retained by NRSROs, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2 (2009).
131 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 16.  The SEC noted 
that this lack of documentation made it difficult for SEC Staff to confirm that the individual ratings 
complied with policies and procedures.  It also noted that this lack of documentation could also impede 
the effectiveness of internal and external auditors conducting reviews of rating agency activities.  Id.
132
Id. at 16-17.
133
Id. at 17.  Each examined agency stated that it will conduct this review.  Id.
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4.  The Agencies Lacked Issuer Due Diligence Requirements
Presently there are no requirements that the rating agencies verify 
information in MBS loan portfolios.134 Additionally, there are no requirements 
that the agencies request performance of due diligence on any of the information 
they receive.135 Nor are they required to obtain information about the level of due 
diligence that has or has not been performed by the issuers supplying them with 
information.136 In fact, each rating agency publicly disclosed that it did not engage 
in any due diligence or otherwise seek to verify the accuracy or quality of the loan 
data underlying their ratings.137 While all of the rating agencies examined have 
implemented, or announced that they would implement, measures that are designed 
to improve the integrity and accuracy of the loan data they receive on underlying 
RMBS pools,138 as of the time of this writing, all three agencies’ websites 
continues to contain extensive language disclaiming they do not engage or require 
any sort of due diligence. 139
134 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 17.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 17-18.  This again proves the agencies’ attempts to disclaim any and all responsibility for 
their ratings.  While this probably should not even be acceptable for transactions where they were truly 
brought in at arms-length, it becomes especially dubious in situations where they were involved in the 
actual process of creating of securities.
138
Id. at 18.  In January 2008, one agency began conducting more extensive reviews of mortgage 
originations and their practices, including a review of originator/conduit/issuer due diligence reports 
and a sample of mortgage origination files for all subprime transactions.  Id. This same agency had 
conducted an internal review of forty-five loan files and reported that it had found the appearance of 
fraud or misrepresentation in almost every file.  Id. Another agency announced that after May 1, 2008, 
it was requesting updated loan level performance data from issuers on a monthly basis.  Id. It also 
intended to incorporate the quality of an originator’s fraud tools and detection policies into its ratings 
criteria by mid-year 2008.  Id.  Additionally, all three of the major rating agencies agreed to develop 
and publicly disclose due diligence criteria to be performed by underwriters on all mortgages 
comprising MBSs, and to review those results prior to issuing ratings.  Id.
139 Moody’s code of conduct on its website currently includes:
[Moody’s] has no obligation to perform, and does not perform, due diligence 
with respect to the accuracy of information it receives or obtains in connection 
with the rating process. [Moody’s] does not independently verify any such 
information.  Nor does [Moody’s] audit or otherwise undertake to determine that 
such information is complete. Thus, in assigning a Credit Rating, [Moody’s] is in 
no way providing a guarantee or any kind of assurance with regard to the 
accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of factual information reflected, or 
contained, in the Credit Rating or any related [Moody’s] publication.
Moody’s, Code of Professional Conduct, Nov. 6, 2008, http://v2.moodys.com/cust/content/Content.
ashx?source=StaticContent/Free%20Pages/Regulatory%20Affairs/Documents/professional_conduct.pd
f.  S.&P.’s code of conduct on its website currently includes:
[S.&P.] is not obligated to perform any due diligence or independent verification 
of any information submitted to, or obtained by, [S.&P.] in connection with its 
rating and surveillance processes.  [S.&P.] does not perform an audit and does 
not undertake to verify that the information submitted to, or obtained by, [S.&P.] 
is complete.  Ratings are not verifiable statements of fact. The assignment of a 
rating to an issuer or an issue by [S.&P.] should not be viewed as a guarantee of 
the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of the information relied on in 
connection with the rating or the results obtained from the use of such 
information.  [S.&P.] reserves the right at any time to suspend, modify, lower, 
raise, or withdraw a rating or place a rating on CreditWatch in accordance with 
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The SEC’s Proposed Rules include two additional due diligence 
requirements which include:
Whether and, if so, how information about verification performed on assets 
underlying or referenced by a security or money market instrument issued by an 
asset pool or as part of any asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities transaction 
is relied on in determining credit ratings; and
Whether and, if so, how assessments of the quality of originators of assets 
underlying or referenced by a security or money market instrument issued by an 
asset pool or as part of any asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities transaction 
play a part in the determination of credit ratings.140
5.  The Agencies Failed to Document Major Steps in the Rating 
Process
After September 2007, the agencies became required to retain their internal 
records, including any non-public information and work-product, used to form the 
basis of their ratings.141 Prior to September 2007, the agencies had established 
policies and procedures generally requiring documentation of their ratings 
committee processes and key deliberations.142 However, the agencies did not 
always fully document certain significant steps in their subprime MBS and CDO 
ratings processes.143
its policies, guidelines and procedures.
This made it difficult or impossible for the SEC to assess 
Standard & Poor’s, Ratings Services Code of Conduct, Dec. 2008, at 3,  http://www2.standardandpoors
.com/spf/csv/equity/Code_of_Conduct_December%202008.pdf?vregion=us&vlang=en.  Fitch’s code 
of conduct currently includes: 
Ratings are based on information obtained directly from issuers, other obligors, 
underwriters, their experts and other sources Fitch believes to be reliable.  Fitch 
does not audit or verify the truth or accuracy of such information and has 
undertaken no obligation to so audit or verify such information or to perform any 
other kind of investigative diligence into the accuracy or completeness of such 
information.  If any such information should turn out to contain 
misrepresentations or to be otherwise misleading, the rating associated with that 
information may not be appropriate and Fitch assumes no responsibility for this 
risk.  The assignment of a rating to any issuer or any security should not be 
viewed as a guarantee of the accuracy, completeness or timeliness of the 
information relied on in connection with the rating or the results obtained from 
the use of such information.
Fitch Ratings, Code of Conduct, Jan. 2009, at 16-17, http://www.fitchratings.com/web_content/credit_
policy/code_of_conduct.pdf.
140 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, supra note 46, at 19.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.  Specifically the SEC noted lax documentation for: reasoning for deviating from models, 
rating committee actions and decisions, and identification of major process participants.  Id.  Rationale 
for deviations from the model or out of model adjustments was not always documented, this led to the 
SEC being unable to understand the process leading to a rating and identifying the factors that led to the 
ultimate rating.  Id. Lack of documentation on committee actions and decisions included: rating 
committee vote tallies being rarely documented despite being a required item; numerous deal files 
failing to include required addenda and/or included no documentation of the ratings surveillance 
process; failures to make or retain committee memos and/or minutes; and failures to include certain 
relevant information in committee reports.  Id. Lack of documentation on internal procedures and 
analysts and/or ratings committee participants approving ratings included: lack of documentation of
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compliance and identify factors considered when developing ratings.144 This lack 
of documentation also made it difficult for the rating agencies’ internal staff to 
review activities and assess compliance with the firms’ policies.145
Since September 2007, NRSROs are required to make and retain certain 
records relating to their businesses and to retain certain other business records 
made in the normal course of business operations which include identities of any 
credit analyst(s) participating in determining a rating; the identity of the person(s) 
approving the rating before issuance; an indication of whether the rating was 
solicited or unsolicited; and the date of the rating action.146
The SEC again recommended that each examined NRSRO conduct a review 
of its documentation policies and practices to ensure compliance with Rule 17g-
2.147 Each NRSRO stated that it would implement the staff’s recommendations.148
In the SEC’s Proposed Rules there was an amendment that would require 
that if a quantitative model was a substantial component of a ratings process, the 
rating agency would be required to keep a record of the rationale for any material 
difference between the credit rating implied by the model and the final credit rating 
issued.149
6.  The Agencies Engaged in Low Quality Surveillance 
Rating agencies are not required to perform surveillance,150 but they often 
have done so in order to change the ratings when circumstances indicate that a 
change is required.151 The SEC found that resources devoted to surveillance were 
limited, making surveillance and any accompanying surveillance documentation 
limited.152
committee attendees even though internal procedures called for it.  Id. at 20.
This occurred while the agencies claimed they carried out surveillance.  
144
Id. at 19.
145 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 19.
146
Id. at 20.  
147
Id.
148
Id. 
149
Id.  The SEC adopted this proposed rule.  Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 110, at 98-99.
150
Id. at 21. 
151 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 21.
152
Id.  Specifically, the SEC found the surveillance process to be of an even lower quality than that 
of the initial ratings process.  Id. A large reason for this seems to be due to a lack of resources.  Id.
Internal emails demonstrate the lack of employees; in one email addressing surveillance, a manager 
wrote: 
I have been thinking about this for much of the night.  We do not have the 
resources to support what we are doing now. I am seeing evidence that I really 
need to add to the staff to keep up with what is going on with sub prime and 
mortgage performance in general, NOW.
Id. at 21 n.29 (internal quotation marks omitted).  This caused surveillance to be untimely at best.  Id. at 
21.  At worst, the lack of follow up was ridiculous.  Scott McCleskey, head of compliance at Moody’s 
from April 2006 to September 2008 testified that some ratings were not reviewed, sometimes for 
decades.  Gretchen Morgenson, When Bond Ratings Get Stale, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at BU1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/business/economy/11gret.html.  The agencies often 
lacked procedures and policies to perform surveillance.  OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS &
EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 22.  When there were procedures and policies in place, the 
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Therefore, changes that should have been made to a security’s rating often did not 
happen.
The SEC noted under the Exchange Act that the NRSROs are required to 
publicly disclose their procedures and methodologies used to determine ratings.153
The SEC recommended that the NRSROs review their resources devoted to 
surveillance of existing MBS and CDO ratings to determine adequacy.154
Additionally, the SEC recommended the NRSROs ensure that they have 
comprehensive written surveillance procedures, and that they maintain appropriate 
surveillance records.155
Under the SEC’s Proposed Rules, the SEC proposed enhanced disclosure of 
procedures and methodologies that the NRSROs would use to determine credit 
ratings, which would include disclosing how frequently credit ratings are reviewed, 
whether surveillance models and criteria equal their initial rating model 
counterparts, whether changes to initial rating models and criteria are applied 
retroactively to surveilled ratings, and whether changes made to surveillance 
models and criteria are incorporated into initial ratings models and criteria.156
7. The Agencies Failed to Properly Manage Conflicts of Interest
a.  The “Issuer Pays” Conflict
Similar to the allegations by the agencies’ own former executives,157 the 
SEC found that the “issuer pays” model involves an inherent conflict of interest.158
SEC policies require NRSROs to “establish, maintain and enforce policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to address and manage conflicts of interest.”159
The NRSROs have their own policies emphasizing their ratings’ accuracy and 
integrity.160
agencies often failed to follow them.  Id.  Often surveillance did not occur, or if it did, the company 
could not process its own surveillance.  Id. One internal email stated, “[i]f I were the S.E.C. I would 
ask why can [sic] you go back and run the report for each of the months using the same assumptions? 
In theory we should be able to do this.”  Id. at 22 n.31 (internal quotation marks omitted).  So it does 
not seem as though the agencies did not know this was going on.  It appears that they were overworked, 
and the last thing they were addressing was re-rating securities they had already initially rated.  It 
would seem that this lack of surveillance would hurt the agencies’ reputations, but they did not seem to 
care, as there was blatant lack of surveillance.  
These policies include restricting analysts from participating in fee 
153 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 22.  This 
lack of surveillance may be addressed under the SEC’s power to censure, limit the activities, functions, 
or operations of, suspend, or revoke the registration of an NRSRO that fails to maintain adequate 
financial and managerial resources to produce credit ratings with integrity.  Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 22-23. The SEC adopted this proposed rule.  See also Amendments to Rules for 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 110, at 14.
157
See supra Part III.B.1.
158 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 23.  SEC 
rules specify that a conflict of interest exists if an NRSRO being paid by issuers or underwriters to rate 
their securities.  Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. Practically every major company has similar policies.  This does not seem to mean much, 
especially in light of the SEC finding numerous questionable actions in its investigation.  
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discussions with issuers.161 While these policies existed, the SEC found key 
participants in the ratings process still participated in fee discussions.162
The SEC’s Proposed Rules included a proposal to amend existing rules to 
disallow NRSRO employees from being involved in both fee discussions and 
ratings decisions.163 This amendment prohibits an NRSRO from having an 
individual participate in any fee discussions or arrangements when that individual 
has participated in developing, determining, or approving procedures or 
methodologies used for determining credit ratings.164
“Analysts appeared to be aware, when rating an issuer, of the rating agency’s
business interest in securing the rating of the deal.”165 The SEC staff noted 
multiple communications indicating that some analysts were aware of the firm’s
fee schedules and actual fees.166 There did not appear to be any shielding analysts 
from emails and other communications that discussed fees.167
b.  The “Market Share and Business Interests” Conflict 
While there was no evidence that ratings methodologies, models, or 
decisions were based on attracting or losing market share,168 the SEC did find 
evidence that employees involved in the ratings process voiced concern about 
market share to other employees involved in the ratings criteria developing 
department.169
Under current regulations,170 in addition to NRSROs being required to 
establish, maintain, and enforce policies and procedures reasonably designed to 
take into consideration the nature of its business and address and manage conflicts 
of interest, they are further prohibited from having certain conflicts unless they 
disclose the type of conflict and implement policies and procedures to address and 
manage it.171
161
Id. at 23-24.  The idea behind these policies is separation of the individuals who set and 
negotiate fees from the individuals who actually engage in the rating process.  This is in an effort to 
mitigate the possibility or perception that an agency would link its ratings to its fees.  Id. This does not 
appear to in any way mitigate the financial relationship between the companies though, and in no way 
did this seem to slow the rating agencies’ propensity to slap ratings on everything including “cows.”  
See supra, note 119.
162 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 24.  
Some of the agencies implemented policy changes in 2007 to address analytical personnel being 
involved in fee discussions.  Id.
163 Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 
110, at 43.  This amendment was adopted by the SEC in April 2009.  Id. at 43-44.
164 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 24.  
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 25.  This included emails between analysts and management discussing fees, as well as 
even analysts discussing fees with billing departments of issuing clients.  Id.
168
Id. at 25.
169
Id.
170
See section 15E(h)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
7(h)(1) (2006)); Rule 17g-5 of the Securities Exchange Act (found at 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(b)(6)).
171 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 26 
(“Included among these conflicts is being paid by issuers or underwriters to determine credit ratings 
with respect to securities or money market instruments they issue or underwrite.”).
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Each NRSRO agreed to implement the SEC’s recommendations which 
included reviewing “practices, policies and procedures” for mitigating and 
managing this conflict of interest.”172
The SEC noted its Proposed Rules called for necessitated disclosure on 
assets underlying a security to issue or maintain a rating.173 This allows other 
parties to rate the security allowing for greater accountability by the NRSROs.174
c.  The Internal Audit Process Conflict
The SEC concluded that the rating agencies varied in their internal audit 
programs and compliance with these programs.175 Only one of the three appeared 
adequate in terms of assessing compliance with internal control procedures.176
According to Exchange Act Rule 17g-2(b)(5), NRSROs are required to 
“maintain internal audit plans, reports and related follow-up documents, including 
internal audit plans and reports, documents relating to audit follow-up measures 
and documents identified by auditors as necessary to audit an activity relating to 
the NRSRO’s business as a rating agency.”177 Both of the NRSROs which did not 
conduct acceptable audits agreed to the SEC’s request to review their internal audit 
functions and subsequent management follow-up, particularly in the RMBS and 
CDO ratings areas.178
In summary, with respect to these previous seven areas, the SEC found that 
from 2002 to 2006, the agencies struggled to keep up with the increasing number 
and complexity of deals, failed to disclose significant aspects of the rating process, 
lacked written policies & procedures for complex securities, lacked issuer due 
diligence requirements, failed to document major steps in the ratings process, 
engaged in low quality surveillance, failed to properly manage the “issuer pays”
conflict of interest, mishandled their focus on market share, and failed to maintain 
quality internal audit processes.179 Amazingly, with all of these shortcomings, the 
SEC’s response was, basically, “do better.”180 The SEC “recommended” changes, 
many of which were required under the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act.  
However, the SEC still had no real power to regulate “the substance of the credit 
ratings or the procedures and methodologies.”181
172
Id. at 27 (“In particular, the [s]taff recommended that each NRSRO examined consider and 
implement steps that would insulate or prevent the possibility that considerations of market share and 
other business interests could influence ratings or ratings criteria.”).
This left the SEC as an observer, 
173
Id.  This proposed rule was adopted by the SEC.  Amendments to Rules for Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, supra note 110, at 69.
174 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 27.
175
Id. at 29.  The SEC examined the internal audit portion of their investigation for the time period 
January 2003 to November 2007.  Id. 
176
Id. This sole agency conducted substantive audits of the securities MBSs & CDOs it rated, as 
well as reviews of particular concerns.  Id. at 30.  Additionally, management responded adequately to
recommendations arising from the audits.  Id. One of the other two agencies only performed cursory 
MBS and CDO audits, while the other agency’s audits were full of shortcomings.  Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 3.
180 OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC, supra note 46, at 10-20.
181
Id. at 4.
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who can and did expose harmful practices, but cannot do much more than that.  It 
is clear in the SEC’s report it was a weak observer, choosing to constantly 
recommend strengthening practices and changing methods, but never clearly and 
succinctly stating something was wrong, even when something clearly was.
V. LIABILITY EXPOSURE
Regulation has historically been kept away from the complex financial 
product that the ratings agencies rate.182 It has been only recently that regulators 
became interested in the rating agencies.  Such interest was sparked in 2001, when 
the agencies failed to adjust ratings down from investment grade on the ordinary 
debt of Enron Corporation until four days before Enron filed for bankruptcy.183 A
subsequent tidal wave of legislative and administrative activity pertaining to the 
agencies ensued.184 Congress’ response included the previously discussed 2006 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, which ultimately imposed a small measure of 
regulatory oversight on the NRSROs, which, until then, were essentially 
unregulated.185 The previous lack of regulation has historically left the tort system 
and the market to serve as checks on these agencies.186
Securitized products in general lacked early litigation challenging their legal 
underpinnings.187 The ratings agencies not only lacked early legal challenges like 
the securitization process in general, but subsequently the agencies have 
successfully avoided liability when legal challenges have occurred.188
182 Moran, supra note 11.
Much of 
183 Kettering, supra note 66, at 1674.
184
Id. at 1674-75.  This included at least nine separate congressional hearings, a major 
congressional staff report, and usual reports on the legislation as enacted and predecessor bills.  Id. In 
addition, the SEC held its own hearings, issued a congressionally-mandated report, and floated 
proposals for changing the regulatory treatment of rating agencies before Congress took the subject into 
its own hands.  Id. It is interesting that this wave of political action occurred after the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 was passed.  See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).  Effectively, the 
government deregulated complex securitized instruments, and then turned around and voted for more 
regulation of the ratings agencies, when the political fallout from Enron occurred.  See Kettering, supra 
note 66.  It would seem these two courses could contradict, but the Commodity Futures Modernization 
Act of 2000 actually allowed the SEC to inspect ratings agencies (more oversight); it also attempted to 
open the door to free market competition in the rating industry by allowing new agencies to achieve 
NRSRO designation.  Leone, supra note 105.
185
See, e.g., Husisian, supra note 33.
186
Id.
187
See Kettering, supra note 66, at 1672.  There are many theories as to why the securitization 
process did not come under legal attack in its early years.  Id. This failure to come under early attack 
has led to securitization becoming “too big to fail.”  Id. at 1672-74. The ratings agencies have been 
thought to contribute to the “too big to fail” status of securities.  Id. This is because they created 
securitized products that will survive challenge in an originator’s bankruptcy by the originator 
appropriately setting the ratio of assets in the pool to the amount of debt issued, so the resulting 
instrument was rated at a high investment grade, superior to the originator’s own credit rating, allowing 
the originator to obtain financing at the lower interest rates associated with the highly-rated debt it 
would have been otherwise unable to obtain.  Id.
188
See id. at 1687, 1691 (noting that NRSROs have been very successful in avoiding liability for 
allegedly incorrect ratings).
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this success has arisen from active protections in security laws.189
One commenter stated that in the relatively few cases in which anyone has 
tried to pursue the rating agencies, “the only common element . . . is that the rating 
agencies win.”190 This success has often been based on commonplace defenses.191
A.  Common Defenses
Investors who wish to claim that dealing with a rating agency has 
established, by contract, a greater standard of care by the agency,192 will find the 
agencies have not only not negotiated such contracts, but have explicitly 
disclaimed liability.193 The agencies hide behind the claim that they rely on 
information provided to them by others, and therefore, they are not responsible for 
any errors or omissions or for the results obtained from use of that information.194
The argument that a bond rating agency is an investor’s fiduciary fails 
because in the investment field fiduciary duties are implied only where there is a 
more specialized relationship than that which exists between a rating agency and 
its subscribers.195 Additionally, courts would risk a potential chilling effect on 
credit ratings if they imposed a negligent misrepresentation standard because there 
is no fiduciary relationship or contractual relationship.196
The agencies have consistently claimed “they are financial publishers whose 
ratings are equivalent to newspaper editorials.”197 They claim that a rating is an 
“unfalsifiable opinion.”198
189 A 2002 congressional staff study noted that NRSROs are “officially shielded from liability for 
all but fraud under the securities laws” and are “not held even to a negligence standard of care for their 
work.”  Id. at 1687.
Therefore, it is wholly protected, or in the alternative, 
190
Id. at 1688.
191
Id. (such as lack of duty to an aggrieved investor and the unreasonableness of an investor 
relying on a rating).
192 Husisian, supra note 33, at 456.
193
Id. 
194
See id.  For current disclaimers by the agencies, see resources cited in note 138.
195 Husisian, supra note 33, at 457. In his article, Husisian notes: 
As the parties’ relationship changes from one of private counseling to one of 
public offerings of information, the client’s fiduciary interest declines, and the 
publisher’s first amendment protections increase.  Once the publication reaches 
the level of general publishing, where the clients are known to the publisher only 
as names on a mailing list, the publishers’ fiduciary duty diminishes to zero.  
Thus, Standard & Poor’s has ample support for its contention that “[ratings] do 
not create a fiduciary relationship between Standard & Poor’s and users of the 
ratings since there is no legal basis for the existence of such a relationship.”
Id. at 458 (citing S & P DEBT RATINGS CRITERIA 3 (Roy Weinberger ed. 1986).
196
Id. at 455.
197 Kettering, supra note 66, at 1689.  Several courts have accepted this argument.  See infra Part 
V.A.  
198 Kettering, supra note 66, at 1689. According to Husisian, the agencies contend that: 
                  Ratings are editorial opinions, published in letter form.  The purpose of any 
editorial, whether or not it is in the financial arena, is to communicate 
information to the reader.  The form of the speech is irrelevant, as the Court has 
recognized by granting first amendment protections to certain symbolic acts, such 
as flag-burning.  The first amendment is only concerned with whether ideas are 
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they claim that it is about a matter of public interest and is protected by the “actual 
malice” standard laid down in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.199 Some courts 
have accepted this argument.200 Even Congress took the First Amendment 
argument seriously when it deliberated about the Credit Rating Agency Reform 
Act.201
This First Amendment defense will have to be litigated further.  While “the 
First Amendment has been held by the Supreme Court to protect the editorial 
content of [financial] newspapers and newsletters,”202 ratings may be distinguished 
from these.  It will remain to be seen whether those distinctions will be 
constitutionally significant.203
B.  Has the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act Changed Anything?
Instead of the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act opening the door to 
liability against the ratings agencies, it may have pushed the door even further 
closed.204 The Act forecloses the argument that a rating agency’s election to 
register as an NRSRO can be viewed as a waiver of any First Amendment 
protection that might otherwise apply.205 Additionally, instead of creating any new 
private rights of action, depending on future interpretation, this legislation might 
be read to actually immunize the rating agencies from tort liability stemming from 
allegedly inaccurate ratings.206
being communicated from one person to another, and not the form of the 
communication.
One sentence in this legislation states 
It is apparent, therefore, that bond ratings are indeed the world’s shortest 
editorials.  As editorials, courts should grant them the same deference they grant 
any other protected first amendment publication.  Ratings merely provide a 
simple means for consumers to compare rough levels of risk among varying 
companies and industries.
Husisian, supra note 33, at 454-55.
199 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Kettering, supra note 66, at 1689. 
200 Kettering, supra note 66, at 1689 n.450 (citing Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Investors Servs., 
Inc., 499 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2007); Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., 
Inc., 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 
2d 742 (S.D. Tex. 2005); County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., Inc., 245 B.R. 151 (C.D. Cal. 1999); 
Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004); LaSalle 
Nat’l Bank v. Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co., 951 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)) .
201 During these deliberations the agencies raised First Amendment objections which led to the 
revision of an early version of the legislation.  Kettering, supra note 66, at 1689-90.  Even after the law 
passed, the agencies still stuck to these objections.
202
Id. at 1690, n.453 (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985)).
203 Some courts have noted that the “issuer pays” model is unlike ordinary journalists being paid by 
a (hopefully) neutral party, while other courts have not.  Kettering, supra note 66, at 1690, n.454 (citing 
Commercial Fin. Servs., 94 P.3d at 110; LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co., 951 F. 
Supp. 1071, 1095-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).  Another proposition is that rating agencies are associated with 
the structuring of a transaction, therefore they are too dissimilar from common journalistic activity to 
merit journalist legal protection.  Id. at 1690-91 n.455 (citing In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104, 110-11
(2d. Cir. 2003). 
204
Id. at 1688. 
205
Id. at 1691.
206 The 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act forecloses the argument that a rating agency’s 
election to register as an NRSRO can be viewed as a waiver of any First Amendment protection that 
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“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” no state or political subdivision 
“may regulate the substance of credit ratings.”207 This sentence raises the question 
of whether state law is preempted from extending application of ordinary tort law 
to an allegedly inaccurate rating; whether it does will turn on the interpretation of 
“regulat[ing] the substance” of a rating.208
C.  Barrier to Litigation: Complexity of the Ratings Process
In the past, the idea of holding ratings agencies to a negligence standard has 
been proposed but issues have been raised.209 One issue with attempting to litigate 
with a negligence standard against the rating agencies is that securitization and the 
ratings process is very complex and specialized.210 Most jurors are unfamiliar with 
the field, and would “have great difficulty distinguishing significant factors from 
insignificant ones.”211 Therefore any negligence standard may be difficult for an 
agency to be held to because of the lack of clarity about what is reasonable, and 
what is negligent.212 Additionally, past commentators have stated the agencies 
have a high degree of accuracy.213 This accuracy, coupled with the inherent 
complexity has resulted in a situation where only major instances of clear 
negligence could be pursued.214
might otherwise apply.  Id. at 1691.
Possible clear enough negligence has not existed, 
until now.
207 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §15E(c)(2) as added by the 2006 legislation. The statute reads 
in full as follows:
Limitation--The rules and regulations that the Commission may prescribe 
pursuant to this title, as they apply to nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations, shall be narrowly tailored to meet the requirements of this title 
applicable to nationally recognized statistical rating organizations. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the Commission nor any 
State (or political subdivision thereof) may regulate the substance of credit 
ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which any nationally recognized 
statistical rating organization determines credit ratings.
207 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §15E(c)(2) as added by the 2006 legislation. The statute reads 
in full as follows:
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §15E(c)(2) (2008).  After the legislation 
had been reported out of committee, this sentence was slipped in through a 
last-minute amendment, made on the Senate floor.  Kettering, supra note 
66, at 1688-89. 
208 Kettering, supra note 66, at 1689. Language elsewhere by the same floor amendment preserves 
the power of state securities commissions to bring enforcement actions against rating agencies with 
respect to “fraud or deceit.”  Id. This would seem to discourage a broad reading of “regulate the
substance.”  Id. Additionally, congressional intent reflects a desire to impose some modest controls on 
the rating agencies.  Id. Nowhere does congressional intent approach the notion of awarding the rating 
agencies immunity from any risk of tort liability on account of their ratings.  Id. However, “plain 
language” interpretation may promote this interpretation.  Id.
209 Husisian, supra note 33, at 443.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
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D.  Future Litigation 
The SEC’s findings may set the stage for potential disclosure-related claims 
by purchasers of subprime RMBS and CDOs against the rating agencies.215
Failure by the agencies to disclose modeling risks or other practices may amount to 
materially false or misleading statements.216  Additionally, the numerous conflicts 
of interest issues raised by the SEC could clearly weigh against the agencies.217
Rating agencies will defend themselves by claiming they used proven 
modeling, material process disclosure, and appropriate on-going surveillance.218
They will also claim their models were valid and accurate when made, 219 and the 
ensuing downgrades were due to market failure, coupled with appropriate 
surveillance.220 However, the notion of existence of appropriate surveillance seems 
preposterous when it is considered that at least ten of the large companies that 
failed or were bailed out in 2008 had investment grade ratings when they went 
under.221
The defense that then-made assertions were valid and “no one could have 
foreseen this” will probably be raised by many companies and individuals.  
However, many people held positions where they were responsible for 
understanding what they were analyzing.  Their jobs as analysts were to literally 
understand the risk.  It would not seem incredulous that with even a small amount 
of foresight all one of these individuals would have to do would be to realize that 
lending to consumers was out of control and unsustainable, which would, in turn, 
cause a decrease in the payouts of underlying securities and therefore a decline in 
these securities’ respective values.
It would seem ridiculous that an “appropriate surveillance” defense 
could be used on far more complex securities if the agencies could not even 
remotely accurately conduct surveillance on large companies with relatively 
transparent books. 
Investors may bring actions based on “information failures” under antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws. 222
215 Robert N. Rapp &. Scott C. Matasar, Commentary, Risk Modeling Implications for Potential 
Rating Agency Liability to Purchasers of Subprime Mortgage-Backed Securities, Sept. 30, 2008, 2008 
Emerging Issues 2966 (LEXIS).
These claims may or may not involve 
fraud, depending on whether false or misleading representations are made with 
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id.  
219
Id. This will likely be a cry heard from many institutions.  They may claim in collective unison 
that “no one could have foreseen this.”  However, many people held positions where they were 
responsible for understanding what they were analyzing.  Their jobs as analysts were to literally 
understand risk.  It would not seem incredulous that with even a small amount of foresight, only one of 
these individuals would have to realize that lending to consumers was out of control and unsustainable, 
which would, in turn, cause a decrease in the payouts of underlying securities and therefore a decline in 
these securities respective value.  
220
Id.
221 David Segal, Buffett Is Unusually Silent on Rating Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at B1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/business/18buffett.html.
222
Id. For these purposes the definition of information failure would be “an untrue statement of a 
material fact or the omission to state a material fact such that a statement actually made is not 
misleading.”  Id.
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scienter. 223 Alternatively, when claiming information failures claimed under 
sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Securities Act, scienter may not need to be shown 
to recover.224 These claims would include the ratings agencies with respect to 
their positions as advisors in the public offering process. 225
Additionally, 15 U.S.C. § 77(l)(2) provides a “private right of action for a 
purchaser of a security to recover from any person who sells the security by means 
of a prospectus or oral statement in which there is an information failure.”226
However, while there is also not a requirement for fraud or deception, there is a 
reasonable care defense and a casual connection must be established between the 
information failure and the purchaser’s loss.227 The large problem here is that, 
while the agencies may have been involved in the formation of the securities as 
they took a hands-on approach to the structuring process, they were not involved in 
the actual distribution or sale of the securities.228
Investors could also seek to recover under section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 adopted under it. 229
223
Id.  “Scienter” is a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.  Id.
However, under 
224
Id.
225
Id.  The Securities Act of 1933 grants a right to action for purchasers and states:
     In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became 
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a 
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements 
therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved 
that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, 
either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue . . . . [A]ny 
person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who has 
with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the 
registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation 
which is used in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the 
statement in such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to 
have been prepared or certified by him.
15 U.S.C. 77k(a)(4) (2008) (emphasis added).  This allows for a purchaser to recover without having to 
show fraud or deception, but it does provide a due diligence defense.  Rapp & Matasar, supra note 215.
226 Rapp & Matasar, supra note 215 (citing 15 U.S.C. 77(l)(2) (2009)).
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id. Section 10b states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-- . . . .
     To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, or 
any securities-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act), any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (2008).  Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in 
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these antifraud provisions, there must be scienter to recover. 230 Scienter could 
also be inferred.  There are two interesting theories on inferring the proper scienter.  
First, it could be argued that scienter could be inferred “at least in part from the 
fact that rating agencies were paid by issuers in a competitive market to achieve 
desired rating outcomes.”231 Second, the agencies’ failure to disclose modeling 
risk, especially in light of their use of out-of-model and undocumented 
adjustments, could be used to infer scienter.232 The SEC’s report supports these 
lines of reasoning by its clear showing of a lack of transparency at the agencies.233
Intent to deceive would be harder to prove especially as the agencies would 
argue that their reputational values would have been on the line, and they of course 
would not have wanted to risk that for something so fleeting as short-term profits.
VI. CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Whether or not suits are brought, the system is clearly broken and the role of 
the agencies is not clear.  Currently, the agencies have the best of both worlds: they 
issue ratings which must be observed according to regulation, and they also 
maintain the defense that they merely issue non-binding “opinions” that investors 
may or may not observe.  With the government now taking a closer look at 
increasing regulation across the board, there is increased possibility that the 
NRSROs will perhaps be even more defined than the loose parameters set by the 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act.  It is true the SEC has inquired into the 
agencies’ actions.  However, the SEC’s report on the agencies seems to handle 
numerous and serious errors and omissions with kid gloves.  It would seem, in 
light of the financial crisis we face, that it is time to call a spade a spade and for the 
government to intervene and allow organizations that created this mess to be 
punished.  This may not mean actual government sponsored prosecution against all 
participants, but rather allowance of free market principles to work and weed out 
the institutions that should fail.  With regard to the rating agencies, the government 
should take a more activist approach and allow the SEC real authority to take 
action against the agencies.  However, in the present case, this seems almost 
impossible in light of the fact that NRSROs have had no regulation, so in effect 
they have committed no sins.  
To what standard can we hold organizations that are not subject to any 
standards?  It is here we face a choice to regulate or deregulate.  Preferably, the 
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).  
230 Rapp & Matasar, supra note 215.  Scienter could be shown by “knowledge of false or 
misleading information and intent to deceive, or by proof of reckless disregard for the truth of 
information on which investors relied.”  Id. It would seem that the SEC’s report would point at least to 
this knowledge.  Intent to deceive would be harder to prove, especially as the agencies would argue that 
their reputational values would have been on the line, and they, of course, would not have wanted to 
risk that for something so fleeting as short-term profits.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id. 
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government would decrease its use of mandated reliance on the rating agencies’
ratings, which could open the door to competition and decreased reliance on the 
big three agencies.  However, if governments continue mandating the use of 
ratings in globalized regulations, it would seem that increased regulation is a must.  
Transparency is a start.  If investors are to use ratings to attain and achieve 
government recognized positions, then those investors must be able to clearly 
understand what those ratings mean.  Allowing investors access to the 
fundamentals of the ratings analysis and clarifying exactly what constitutes the 
ratings themselves is imperative.  This, however, is highly unlikely as the big three 
agencies have a stranglehold on the rating market for which they will be loathe to 
give up as there is sure to be increased competition with increased transparency.  
Ironically, this seems negligible by the reputational element that the agencies 
constantly remind us is their sole concern.  For if reputation is what matters in this 
game, why would investors want to use late entrants, even if these late entrants are 
using similar ratings analysis?  Another interesting twist is while governments may 
choose to increase requirements for these agencies, what is the risk to those 
governments?  The agencies are so powerful that they can take even the mightiest 
governments to their knees.234
While the agencies have remained until now “litigation-proof,” it will remain 
to be seen if this can continue.  One interesting result of this current crisis is 
increased awareness by the public-at-large of the way our economy works and its 
key players to the economy.  It would seem that lay people, who had no previous 
interest, now have motivation to understand what happened to their retirement 
accounts.  Now appears to present a perfect storm of laypeople’s interest piqued in 
complex financial instruments and finance market participant interactions.  This 
could lead to the ability, at least at some level, for lay persons to grasp the 
intricacies necessary to hold rating agencies accountable.  Even if the complexities 
of the securitization processes are beyond jurors, now more than ever, jurors would 
be more likely to side with injured plaintiffs against large recognizable entities 
who contributed to the current international economic downfall.  The rating 
agencies seem perfect candidates as such entities.  This may provide the incentive 
for plaintiffs to test legal theories, such as “information failure,” on the agencies 
and other key economic players.  Where scienter is necessary, juries may be more 
likely to infer it now.  
  Will this prove to be a disincentive for 
governments to impose any real regulation on the agencies?  Only time will tell.  
After the disappointing SEC rule adoption on December 3, 2008, President 
Barack Obama has called for increased government oversight of the rating 
agencies.235
234
See Bruner, supra note 6, at 141 (discussing the ill effects befalling Malaysia when it adopted 
capital controls counter to the ratings agencies’ preference for none).
  Legislators seem to be paying attention and are introducing 
235
Do the SEC’s New Rating Agency Rules Have Any Bite?, supra note 72.  President Obama’s 
original transition team asked the Financial Economists Roundtable for its views on ratings reform.  Id.
Later, in July 2009, President Obama released a rating agency reform plan.  Ronald D. Orol, Obama 
Releases Credit Rating Agencies Reform Plan, MARKETWATCH.COM, July 21, 2009, http://www.market 
watch.com/story/obama-releases-credit-rating-agencies-reform-plan.  The proposal included efforts to 
limit conflicts of interest by “barring rating firms from consulting with companies they rate and 
requiring corporations to disclose ‘pre-ratings’ obtained from credit rating agencies before a rating firm 
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legislation aimed at reigning in the rating agencies.236 States are exploring pursuit 
of the agencies through criminal liability.237 The SEC has shown increased 
interest in the role of the rating agencies.238 Private money is finally taking strong 
swings at the agencies.239  Additionally, the creation of new competitive 
alternatives to the big three is being explored.240  Of course, the agencies are still 
protesting increased oversight and defending their actions.241 However, calls for 
action by the public and private sectors will likely only increase as it is being 
estimated that the failure of credit rating agencies in the recent financial crisis “will 
cost the world economy as much as $3 trillion by the end of 2010.”242 Whether 
any of the recent momentum against the agencies will result in real changes 
remains to be seen.243
is selected to conduct a rating.”  Id. This would give investors access to all the pre-ratings a corporation 
received, thus eliminating (hopefully) “ratings shopping” by corporations and issuers.  Id. The Proposal 
also included the formation of a special office at the SEC to watch over rating agencies.  Id.
Perhaps soon, with increased scrutiny, these gatekeepers’
236 Marcy Gordon, Lawmaker Wants to Hold Ratings Firms Liable For Inaccuracies, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Oct. 1, 2009, http://www.boston.com/business/personalfinance/articles/2009/10/01/lawmaker_
wants_to_hold_ratings_firms_liable_for_inaccuracies/.  Specifically, a draft bill was introduced that 
included a plan meant to make ratings agencies collectively liable for inaccuracies.  Id. This draft also 
included President Obama’s proposals.  Id.
237 Pia Sarkar, California Subpoenas 3 Firms in MBS Ratings Probe, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS,
Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090917/DAILYREG/9091
79984&crit=Pia%20Sarkar,%20California%20Subpoenas%203%20Firms%20in%20MBS%20Ratings
%20Probe.  California Attorney General Edmund “Jerry” Brown Jr. initiated an investigation to 
determine whether the three rating agencies “violated state law by assigning high ratings to risky 
assets.”  Id. New York and Connecticut initiated similar investigations before California.  Lyanne 
Melendez, Brown to Probe Credit Rating Agencies, ABC7NEWS.COM, Sept. 17, 2009, 
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/east_bay&id=7019369.
238
See Press Release, SEC, SEC Roundtable to Examine Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies 
(Apr. 6, 2009) (on file with author), available at http://www.sec. gov/news/press/2009/2009-46.htm).
239 In July 2008, the $198.9 billion Sacramento-based California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System, the nation’s biggest public pension fund, initiated a $1 billion lawsuit against all three agencies 
for “wildly inaccurate” credit ratings See Sarkar, supra note 237.  In New York, a class-action lawsuit 
was filed by investors claiming “the raters hid the risks of securities linked to subprime mortgages.”  
Joel Rosenblatt, California Will Investigate Ratings Firms, Brown Says (Update2), BLOOMBERG.COM,
Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aAjpJ7wqnuw0.  With 
regard to fraud charges filed in this suit, a federal judge forced the companies to respond.  Id. The 
Judge rejected arguments by Moody’s and S.&P. that investors cannot sue over deceptive ratings of 
private-placement notes because those opinions are protected by free-speech rights.  Id. It remains to be 
seen what will come of this action.  Until now, no rating agency has ever been successfully sued for 
misleading investors.  Steven Pearlstein, Missing the Mark On Ratings-Agency Reform, WASH. POST,
Sept. 18, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/17/AR2009091704608
.html. 
240 Several investment companies, including BlackRock, PIMCO, Promontory, and Risk Metrics, 
are in discussions to create alternatives to Fitch, Moody’s and S.&P.  Yael Bizouati, NY State Wants to 
Fire Moody’s and S&P, THE BUS. INSIDER, Sept. 18, 2009, http://www.businessinsider.com/ny-state-
insurance-department-asks-top-firms-to-replace-rating-agencies-2009-9.
241
See Kim Dixon, UPDATE 1-Rating Agencies Protest Broader Oversight, REUTERS, Sept. 30, 
2009.  Moody’s CEO, Raymond McDaniel, said imposing “collective liability” on the agencies is 
unnecessary and could lead to more lawsuits.  Id.
242 Timothy Inklebarger, CalPERS Exec Urges Credit-Rating Reform, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS,
Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.pionline.com/article/20090930/DAILYREG/909309983.
243
See Colin Barr, Business As Usual for Moody’s and S&P, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 9, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/09/news/economy/ratings.reform.fortune/index.htm?postversion=20091
00915.  The agencies have performed poorly in the past and, although cries for change occurred then, 
not much came of it.  Id.
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role for the future will become clearer.
